COPYRIGHT © Oxford University Press 2007
Journal of International Economic Law
1 September 2007
J Int Economic Law (2007) 10 (3): 585
LENGTH: 8672 words
TOPIC: WTO Constraints on RTAs
TITLE: Ensuring that Regional Trade Agreements Complement the WTO System: US Unilateralism A Supplement to WTO Initiatives?
AUTHOR: Matthew Schaefer, Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. Email: mschaefer1@unlnotes.unl.edu TEXT:
Abstract In the mid-1990s, the policy debate within the WTO focused on whether regional trade agreements (RTAs) were building blocks or stumbling blocks for the WTO system, essentially questioning whether regionalism was appropriate at all from an economic policy perspective. Given the proliferation of RTAs since that time and the inability to roll back the clock, that policy debate has been replaced by a search for strengthened constraints on RTA activity that might ensure it
complements the WTO system. Three major controversies within many existing RTAs are the exclusion of agriculture from coverage, complex and restrictive rules of origin, and varied treatment of the application of trade remedies. Despite some competing policy considerations, it is likely, on balance, that the WTO system would benefit if agriculture was required to be included in RTA coverage, if RTA rules of origin were simplified and liberalized, and if the controversy surrounding RTA treatment of trade remedies was cleared up. However, the search for constraints within the WTO system to achieve these results, either through the Doha negotiations or the dispute settlement system seems unlikely to succeed in the near future. Accordingly, enhanced and extended efforts by the US, either unilaterally or in conjunction with its RTA partners utilizing its negotiating leverage, may be a necessary supplement to efforts within the WTO in ensuring a more harmonious relationship between RTAs and the WTO system.
Introduction
Virtually every important WTO member is now party to a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) n1 and roughly one-half of world trade occurs under preferential tariff rates. Through the end of 2006, over 368 RTAs were notified to the WTO of which over 260 occurred after January 1995, reflecting a surge in RTA activity that actually began in the late 1980s/early 1990s. It is estimated that by 2010, over 400 RTAs will have been implemented worldwide. n2 The debate in academic and policy circles in the
1990s focused on whether RTAs were building blocks n3 or stumbling blocks n4 for the multilateral system. Specific criticism was directed at the United States for its pursuit of regionalism because of its undue bargaining power in bilateral and small group negotiations. However, US abstinence from RTA negotiations from 1995-2000 did nothing to stem the tide of regionalism. Moreover, the US has traditionally only turned to a robust regional agenda when the WTO system has stalled in achieving further trade liberalization.
Given the proliferation of RTAs, the inability to turn back the clock and the political and diplomatic capital the US has invested in reinvigorating its RTA agenda, the policy debate has moved to an acceptance of the existence of RTAs and a focus on mechanisms both within the WTO system and outside that system that might ensure that this robust RTA activity complements, rather than detracts from, the WTO system. Part I of this article examines three major controversies associated with RTAs: the exclusion of agriculture from significant liberalization in many RTAs, complex and restrictive rules of origin established by RTAs, and the varied treatment of trade remedy laws within RTAs. Part II examines existing WTO constraints on the use of RTAs and explores the possibility of strengthening WTO constraints, in particular to eliminate some of the negative consequences flowing from these controversies. Part III considers what efforts the US could undertake either unilaterally or in conjunction with RTA partners to help ensure that regionalism complements the global trading system. The analysis in Parts II and III reveals a potentially large irony: unilateral actions by the US and actions in conjunction with its RTA partners using the significant negotiating leverage of the US in bilateral and regional negotiations may be more successful than efforts within the WTO, or at least a necessary supplement to efforts within the WTO, at ensuring that RTAs better complement the WTO system.
I. Major controversies regarding RTAs
The original GATT (1947-94) and subsequently the WTO system (1995 to present) both allow an exception for RTAs in part because it was thought that the trade creation effects of an RTA that complied with certain conditions laid out in the GATT/WTO system would outweigh any trade diversionary effects (i.e. the growth in trade between the RTA countries would outweigh the loss of trade between third countries and the RTA countries). n5 However, the ambiguities in the conditions laid out in the GATT/WTO system for RTAs have lead to at least three major controversies in the way RTAs have been structured: (i) many RTAs exclude agriculture from coverage, at least to some exent; (ii) many RTAs have highly complex and restrictive rules of origin that might divert trade from third countries as RTA partner countries use inputs from partner countries rather than cheaper inputs from third countries to comply with the rules of origin necessary to gain the preferential tariff rates under the RTA and (iii) many RTAs do not eliminate the application of trade remedies to products from RTA partner countries, thus not leading to full liberalization of internal trade within the RTA, but may give some special treatment in this regard, potentially creating third country impacts. Aside from the legal ambiguities allowing for these controversies, each of these major problems has many economic nuances and numerous competing policy considerations as not only must the trade creation v trade diversion issue be considered but also the impact of these RTA features on countries incentives to be forthcoming in WTO negotiations.
A. The exclusion of agriculture
A WTO study early in the Doha Round of negotiations confirmed, both in terms of percentage of trade and duty-free tariff lines, that agriculture is not liberalized nearly as much as industrial products in RTAs. n6 Many RTAs utilize a negative list approach (covered unless specifically excluded) for industrial products and, in contrast, employ a positive list approach (not covered unless specifically included) for agricultural products. Additionally, when an agricultural product is included in an RTA, it tends to be subject to tariff reduction but not duty elimination. n7 Finally, there is less harmonization across overlapping RTAs in agriculture n8 and tariff peaks are more likely to remain in the agricultural sector.
The reason for this phenomenon is that the behavior of countries within their RTAs on agricultural issues tends largely to parallel their behavior on agricultural issues in the WTO. n9 Under this line of thinking, the exclusion of agriculture is merely another symptom or manifestation of the same political sensitivities that prevent significant liberalization in the WTO. However, it may be that allowing RTA activity that largely excludes agriculture is indeed harming multilateral liberalization efforts within the WTO. RTAs that exclude agricultural products allow countries to obtain increased market access in industrial products and engage in new rule development without having to engage in the politically tough liberalization of agriculture - something that they could not get away with in the WTO's 'package deal' framework of negotiations. Assuming the countries pursuing RTAs without agricultural liberalization would chose not to pursue them if they were required to include agricultural goods in a more fulsome manner, then the WTO would be the exclusive forum for them to pursue industrial goods liberalization and new rules creation, and they would only obtain this liberalization and the new rules in exchange for agricultural liberalization. n10 Alternatively, countries might actually pursue RTAs that include agriculture more fully and thus start chipping away at the enormous protectionist sentiment in this sector, albeit with some potential for significant trade diversion as high MFN tariff rates charged to third countries impact demand from those countries as compared with RTA partner country products subject to preferential rates. Another possible scenario is that countries with defensive interests in the agricultural sector might simply pursue RTAs with countries that do not threaten their agricultural sectors, but this would at least reduce the amount of RTA activity and still increase the pressure on governments to utilize the WTO forum. Regardless of which of these scenarios played out, a requirement to include agriculture in RTAs would be a net benefit for the WTO system.
B. Complex and restrictive RTA rules of origin
RTAs include rules of origin to ensure that products more closely connected with a third country do not receive preferential treatment under the RTA without the third country paying reciprocal tariff concessions. RTA rules of origin tend to be more restrictive (stringent) than non-preferential rules of origin utilized by countries, particularly on sensitive items. Concerns have been expressed that overly restrictive RTA rules of origin magnify the trade and investment diversionary effect of RTAs. The more complex and restrictive the RTA rules of origin, the more they can lead to companies within the region using partner country inputs rather than cheaper third country inputs in order to ensure compliance with the rules of origin necessary to obtain the preferential tariff treatment afforded by the RTA.
The shear complexity of the rules, particularly when one considers that many countries are parties to numerous overlapping RTAs, creates substantial administrative and compliance costs for traders and customs administrators (often referred to as the spaghetti bowl effect n11). Indeed, for products in which
the MFN tariff rate is low (and thus there is a low preference margin) some traders simply elect to pay the MFN rate than suffer the administrative costs of complying with the RTA rules of origin (e.g. a significant amount of US-Mexico trade occurs at the MFN rate).
However, one irony is that further RTA activity may lessen this spaghetti bowl effect as 'consolidation' occurs among overlapping RTAs. Broad regional RTAs, such as the expansion of the EU from 15 to 25 countries after the enlargement of the EU to include most of central and eastern Europe in 2004, and the now-stalled Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations among 34 countries, may reduce, although clearly not eliminate, the complexity. Another competing consideration is that stringent rules of origin maximize the incentives of third countries to engage in multilateral liberalization since they have little opportunity to 'free ride' on preferences in the RTA. Despite these competing considerations, on balance, it is generally agreed from a policy perspective that less stringent and less complex RTA rules of origin would be better at achieving GATT Article XXIV's goal of creating trade among RTA partners without diverting it from third countries.
C. The treatment of trade remedies (safeguards, anti-dumping)
RTAs vary widely in how they address the application of trade remedy laws among members - from virtual exclusion from such remedies (although usually in the case of safeguards with the establishment of a lesser RTA-specific emergency remedy) to continued application of both global safeguards and anti-dumping laws. However, exclusion from trade remedy laws is rare compared to continued application of such laws.
Many countries are of two minds on the issue of trade remedies in RTAs. Most greatly desire to be excluded from the application of such laws, particularly by large market countries such as the US, in their RTAs with those countries as it would lead to greater trade liberalization. However, when they are outside an RTA offering exclusion, partial or full, from a trade remedy law, they believe their interests are hurt by such exclusion, i.e. they 'take a bigger hit' when remedies are applied. The WTO Appellate Body has not ruled on whether excluding RTA partners from the application of trade remedy laws is required, allowed or prohibited by GATT's exception for regional trade agreements, but they have lessened the latter concern by ruling that there must be parallelism between the imports investigated and the remedy (i.e. a country cannot include RTA partner imports in the investigation - thereby making it more likely that imports will be viewed as a cause of injury to domestic industry - and then exclude them at the remedy stage). n12
The treatment of trade remedy laws within US and other large market RTAs can have a significant impact on countries' willingness to pursue multilateral liberalization. The US continues to be the largest user of antidumping laws (although the EU is also a large user and many developing countries are significantly increasing their use of such laws). If the US were to begin offering exclusion from anti-dumping laws in its RTAs, then those RTA partner countries would have a reduced incentive to engage in the multilateral liberalization processes. Similarly, safeguard remedial actions have substantially increased since the creation of the WTO in 1995 (and the banning of so-called gray measures such as voluntary restraint agreements). Thus, exclusion from application of global
safeguards is also something desirable for US RTA negotiating partner countries. n13 The US market, in terms of MFN tariff rates, is relatively open. Thus, the largest complaint of foreign trading partners of the US tends to focus on extensive use of so-called 'contingent protectionism' or trade remedy laws.
Of course, one could make similar arguments regarding exclusion of trade remedies to those made with respect to the inclusion of agriculture. If countries were required to exempt RTA partners from trade remedies, then at least some countries, such as the US, might largely cease RTA activity due to the political sensitivity of changing or weakening trade remedy laws. Alternatively, they may conclude RTAs that exempt partner countries from trade remedies, thus slowly chipping away at the protectionist sensitivities, although possibly increasing third country impacts. On balance, however, it is likely that multilateral liberalization efforts will benefit from the US preserving at least the anti-dumping negotiating chip for the Doha Round as this chip is one of the few significant ones the US maintains to force further MFN tariff liberalization within other countries (US MFN rates, as mentioned before, generally being quite low already). n14 Because application of US safeguards remedies is not as big a negotiating chip as anti-dumping laws, it is probably not too harmful to the WTO trade liberalization process if the US replaces global safeguards remedies with RTA-specific emergency remedies vis a vis its RTA partner countries.
II. Strengthened WTO constraints on RTAs
The three major controversies surrounding RTAs persist due to the lack of clarity surrounding the existing constraints within the WTO. Institutional mechanisms within the WTO system do exist for clarifying and strengthening these existing constraints, however, numerous complications have previously prevented and may continue to prevent the mechanisms from being successfully utilized.
A. Existing constraints n15
GATT Article XXIV permits the formation of customs unions, free trade agreements and interim agreements leading to the formation of such agreements 'within a reasonable length of time'. However, the language of Article XXIV is broad, imprecise language that, when combined with inadequate review and monitoring, leaves considerable room in practice for auto-interpretation by members to an RTA. (The corresponding language in General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article V and the language in the Enabling Clause permitting RTAs between developing countries are filled with as much if not more uncertainty and wiggle room). Article XXIV declares that the purpose of an RTA should be to facilitate trade between its members and 'not to raise barriers to the trade' of third countries. In terms of internal requirements for an RTA, Article XXIV requires that 'duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted by Art. XI, XII, XIV, XV, and XX)
n16
are eliminated with respect to substantially all trade'. In terms of external requirements, an RTA
cannot impose 'duties and other regulations of commerce that are higher or more restrictive' than the general incidence of duties and regulations of commerce existing in the RTA members' territories prior to the formation of the RTA. n17 The Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV clarified certain issues related to compensation negotiations and assessing tariff barriers affecting third party trade upon the formation or enlargement of a customs union n18 and also clarified that a reasonable period of time for an interim arrangement was generally to be taken to mean ten years. However, the Understanding did not clarify several terms related to the specific problems arising out of the increased RTA activity described above.
First, the term 'substantially all trade' was not clarified, leaving open the question of whether such a determination should be based on trade coverage or tariff lines or some combination. For example, the question can be raised whether an RTA that excludes agriculture meets the substantially all
requirement if agriculture is a small percentage of trade between the RTA members (perhaps because of high trade barriers) and taking account of the fact that agricultural products constitute roughly 15% of tariff lines. The preamble to the Uruguay Round Understanding states that WTO members recognize that the contribution of RTAs to the expansion of world trade is 'diminished if any major sector is excluded'. While this language might help influence the interpretation of the term 'substantially all', it is not an obligation in and of itself.
Second, the Understanding did not clarify whether the exceptions list to the substantially all requirement is an exclusive list or not. Thus, the question can be raised whether, internally, an RTA would be required (or at least permitted) to eliminate the application of trade remedy laws (e.g. safeguards authorized by GATT Article XIX and anti-dumping duties authorized by GATT Article VI) among members.
Third, the terms 'other regulations of commerce' and 'other restrictive regulations of commerce' were not clarified, leaving open the question of whether RTA rules of origin are included within the meaning of these terms. For example, the question can be raised whether rules of origin should be included in an assessment of whether barriers to third country trade are higher or more restrictive than pre-RTA barriers n19 or even taken into account when determining whether substantially all trade has been liberalized among RTA members. n20
B. Existing review and monitoring procedures n21
GATT Article XXIV requires countries to 'promptly notify' other WTO members when deciding to enter an RTA and to make available such information as will enable WTO members to make reports and recommendations. In practice, many notifications occur after RTAs are finalized. Under the GATT, individual working parties were established to examine RTAs that were notified to the body. In virtually every review, the working parties were unable to come to any consensus on the consistency of the RTA with Article XXIV requirements. In February 1996, the General Council created the Committee on RTAs in an effort to improve the review and monitoring of RTAs. However, significant problems remain. The committee has only reached consensus on WTO consistency in one case and even most factual examinations of RTAs prepared by the Committee have been held up from adoption. Further, the chairmen of the committee complained in 2002 of the unwillingness of countries to provide, or significant delays in providing, information on their RTAs for the factual examination reports. Some of this unwillingness was alleged to be a result of so-called 'dispute settlement awareness' (i.e. fear that the information will lead to and/or be used against them in a future dispute settlement case).
C. Forums for strengthening constraints
Two possible avenues exist for strengthening the current WTO constraints on RTAs: the broad Doha Round negotiations (originally launched in 2001) and the WTO dispute settlement system. n22
1. Negotiations
The Doha Ministerial Declaration launching the current round of WTO negotiations provides for the following mandate for negotiations on RTAs: 'clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements'. n23 The literature on RTAs is
filled with many far-reaching proposals for improving WTO disciplines. Most of these are not politically feasible, although some far-reaching proposals in the literature have actually seen reflection in government proposals.
For example, in an effort to end the discrimination against third countries created by RTAs, it has been suggested that the WTO should require that an 'open accession' clause be included in all RTAs. n24 The proposal ignores the key question of what concessions would be required of countries wishing to join, keeping in mind that the phase out periods on tariffs on certain goods is important even if all trade were to be liberalized within an RTA. Such a requirement also ignores the non-trade goals that are important considerations when choosing RTA partners (e.g. Cuba is not a participant in FTAA negotiations). n25 Yet, Taiwan proposed that the WTO require such a clause to be put in all RTA agreements, explaining in response to criticism, that it simply would require an opportunity to negotiate.
n26
There have also been suggestions that the WTO should hold negotiations to harmonize preferential
rules of origin. n27 However, the exceedingly slow progress in the harmonization negotiations of non-preferential rules of origin (initially due to be concluded in 1997 but continuing today) cautions against proceeding with negotiations on the trickier topic of preferential rules of origin.
Another proposal in the literature was a proposal that all RTA tariff cuts be extended on an MFN basis five years from the cut thereby limiting the length of time preferences under an RTA could remain in place to five years. n28 This proposal, if adopted wholesale, might lead to 'dirty' RTAs with even more numerous carve-outs and/or dramatically reduce the incentive of third countries to engage in multilateral liberalization (and simply free-ride on RTA tariff cuts as they are multilateralized). However, a US proposal in the Doha Round in 2003 for elimination of all tariffs globally by the year 2015 would have achieved the advantages of the academic proposal (by limiting the length of time that RTA preferences would remain in place) but without the disadvantages because it would not allow for any free riders. Of course, most other countries considered the US proposal too far-reaching and politically infeasible as well because developing countries would lose their preferences under GSP and other schemes in the industrialized countries' markets and there would be adverse consequences for those developing countries heavily dependent on duties as a source of government revenue (in the absence of improved tax structures and enforcement). To date, only very modest transparency proposals have succeeded in the Doha negotiations and even modest substantive or systemic proposals continue to create significant disagreement among WTO members.
a. Transparency agreement. The Doha negotiations led to an agreement among governments to increase transparency regarding RTAs. n29 In July 2006, WTO members agreed to provisionally implement, pending conclusion of the negotiating round, an agreement that requires WTO members to: (i) inform other members of the launch of negotiations of an RTA; (ii) inform other members of the signature of an agreement and (iii) formally notify an RTA immediately upon ratification. Thus, other members become aware of and can track an RTA's progress from start to finish. The transparency agreement also requires notification to the WTO of changes in implementation or operation of an RTA that occur after the original notification. Information flow is improved by the transparency agreement as it lays out the information that must be provided in notifications including tariff-line data on concessions made in the agreement, trade volume data, rule of origin formulations, etc. Additionally, the dispute settlement awareness problem is partially resolved because factual reports are now prepared by the WTO Secretariat in consultation with the relevant parties. n30
While this transparency agreement is a potentially useful step forward, it does not resolve any of the substantive differences over key terms in Article XXIV. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that implementation of the transparency agreement is still dependent on the good faith of members (as well as enhanced peer pressure) for compliance and that, generally, there are not any significant penalties for failing to comply with notification/ transparency obligations (as many countries have found out with notification obligations in other WTO agreements).
b. Substantive/Systemic proposals. Government proposals on substantive or systemic issues have generally focused on clarifying the term 'substantially all' trade (and the related issues of 'other regulations of commerce' and 'other restrictive regulations of commerce'). As regards the issue of 'substantially all' trade, members are still in discussions as to whether to use a trade volume-based test or a tariff-line based test or some combination of the two. The problem with a pure tariff-line based test is that parties to an RTA could liberalize a very high percentage of tariff lines but still not liberalize a high percentage of trade if the tariff lines they refuse to liberalize currently constitute a large percentage of the trade between the countries to the RTA. The problem with a pure trade-based test is that trade volumes can fluctuate (and thus an agreement's consistency under a trade-based test might fluctuate as well). n31 A trade-based test might also allow countries to an RTA to exclude many tariff lines from liberalization that currently do not have much trade but might in the future were tariffs to be lowered. n32 Thus, many countries are leaning towards some sort of combined test, particularly those interested in curing the agriculture-exclusion problem riddling many current RTAs. For example, Australia, a significant agricultural exporter, has proposed a type of combined test. n33 Australia's submission suggests that at least 70% of tariff lines be liberalized immediately upon entry into force of an RTA and that 95% of tariff lines be fully liberalized within ten years of conclusion of an RTA. To address, the problem of a few tariff lines with high trade volumes being excluded, Australia would supplement its tariff line approach with a requirement that the top 50 tariff lines in terms of trade volume be included in the duty elimination under the RTA or that any tariff line that constituted 0.2% of total imports be included in the liberalization.
Other countries are not satisfied with a pure quantitative test and want to at least supplement any quantitative test with qualitative factors. For example, Japan proposed that the following qualitative factors be considered: (i) the exclusion of any major sector (although the combined quantitative test of Australia would do a good job of ensuring this does not occur in an RTA); (ii) the influence of trade remedy measures; (iii) the extent of tariff reduction; (iv) an assessment of tariff rate quotas and (v) tariff elimination with long implementation periods. n34 These qualitative factors obviously tie into other issues such as what constitutes 'other regulations of commerce' and the 'reasonable period of time' to implement an interim agreement leading to an RTA. The European Union also favors a qualitative as well as quantitative assessment of RTAs adding a few other factors that might be considered, including special safeguards in RTAs and seasonal restrictions on products. n35 However, qualitative factors might lead to the same ambiguity regarding the consistency of the RTAs with WTO disciplines as occurs today and some countries may be suggesting such factors to keep the 'waters muddy' and protect non-robust RTAs from challenge.
With respect to clarifying the term 'other regulations of commerce', India has proposed that it be explicitly agreed that RTA rules of origin fall within the term 'other regulations of commerce'. India's proposal also suggests a requirement that RTA rules of origin be no more restrictive than the most liberal GSP scheme operated by any country member to the RTA. Very few, if any, RTAs, would
currently comply with such a condition so one can imagine the distance that still needs to be bridged in the negotiations on this issue.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the variations in RTAs, not much compromise or consensus has been achieved on substantive and systemic issues to control RTAs. No draft consensus text has been prepared; indeed, governments have even been reluctant to submit text-based proposals.
c. 'Grandfathering' issue. Some countries, including the European Union, suggested early in the negotiations that existing RTAs should be 'grandfathered', i.e. exempted from any new constraints developed in the course of negotiations. n36 This should be strongly resisted for several reasons. First, it could affect the second avenue to strengthening constraints within the WTO system, namely, it may, depending on how phrased, directly or indirectly affect the ability of a WTO member to successfully challenge an existing RTA in the WTO dispute settlement system. Second, to the extent new substantive constraints only impact or deter future RTAs, those constraints may lock in place a worse state of affairs than would exist with further regional activity for, as noted above, some of the broader regional initiatives currently underway may actually help reduce the existing spaghetti bowl effect. Third, as China pointed out in its submission, grandfathering of existing RTAs would discriminate against countries only recently entering into RTA activity. n37
2. WTO dispute settlement system
The Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV eliminated the uncertainty that existed within the GATT system over whether challenges to RTAs within the dispute settlement system were possible
n38
by explicitly declaring that the dispute settlement system is open to such challenges. Indeed, the
Appellate Body stated (or at least very strongly hinted) in the 2000 Turkey Textiles case that they would examine the conformity of an RTA with the internal and external requirements of Article XXIV if presented with such a claim. n39 Additionally, GATT/WTO jurisprudence does not recognize the concept of latches (i.e. a long delay in challenging an RTA does not lead to a presumption of conformity of the RTA with Article XXIV). n40 Therefore, a case against an RTA is a legal possibility. However, whether such a case becomes a reality depends on several factors. While at least some lawyers in the DC trade bar believe that a government could successfully pursue an RTA challenge, bringing such a case carries several risks. First, because nearly all WTO members are party to a RTA and the standards for reviewing conformity are so broad and imprecise, most members will see at least some defensive interests on the issue. Second, potential plaintiffs will need to consider the interaction between the negotiations and an on-going dispute settlement case. If negotiations on RTAs within the Doha Round are leading to nothing fruitful, then a dispute settlement case might be the only hope for moving towards tangible constraints. It is a strategy not without risk, however, because if a case fails, then there will be even less motivation in the negotiations. Third, there is some institutional risk to the Appellate Body being viewed as 'law making' given the broad, imprecise language such a claim would be based upon (similar to the controversy surrounding the Appellate Body's rulings in the area of amicus briefs). n41 Indeed, while the Appellate Body does not like to backtrack, it is possible that they would use a tool of judicial restraint to avoid actually directly addressing a complaint of this nature. n42
Beyond these general considerations, the most likely plaintiff countries seem to have somewhat mixed interests in pursuing such a case. The countries historically most opposed to increased RTA activity (Japan, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong), and most likely to be plaintiffs for systemic reasons, are now negotiating and concluding RTAs themselves (signaling a 'if you cannot beat them, join them'
mentality). One potential claim that might be made in a challenge to an RTA is that its failure to liberalize a major sector such as agriculture runs afoul of the 'substantially all' criteria for internal liberalization. However, Japan and Korea are defensive on agriculture issues and unlikely to make that particular challenge. Indeed, Japan is having trouble making rapid progress in its RTA negotiations due to its agricultural sensitivities. Korea's paper on RTAs in the Doha Round suggests it has many concerns with RTAs but it is unclear that they would choose to go the dispute settlement route (at least until progress in the negotiations can be more clearly assessed).
The United States is another potential plaintiff. As evidenced by the 1980s challenge to the Euro-Med agreements (EC agreements with Mediteranean countries), a complaint by the United States against an RTA has been taken in the past and continues to be a possibility in the future. An EU RTA would be the likely target of any such case n43 as the United States would surely not want to challenge a Latin American RTA for fear of further harming possibilities of reviving FTAA negotiations at some point in the future. However, the overall status of EU-US relations and some fatigue with other controversial cases suggests that another explosive case, such as an RTA complaint, is likely not in the cards in the near future either.
Australia (or another Cairns group member) is another possible plaintiff. Traditionally, it was thought third country agricultural exporters had no interest in challenging agricultural-exclusions within RTAs (in essence asking to be subject to negative preference margins) but the impact of the large number of agricultural-excluded RTAs on multilateral liberalization (and/or the view that any RTA-induced agricultural reforms may eventually benefit or expand to third countries) may change this traditional calculation, although to date it has not.
III. Efforts the US can undertake unilaterally or regionally to ensure RTAs complement multilateralism
With fairly wide disagreement within the WTO negotiations as to how to ensure that RTAs complement the WTO system, and no plaintiff yet willing to step forward within WTO dispute settlement system to challenge the broad legality of an RTA, the question is left as to what actions the United States, as the largest economy in the world and with much negotiating leverage, could take to ensure that at least its own growing regionalism complements the WTO system. Specifically, the question is whether the United States has tools at its disposal as it pursues its regional agenda to ensure that other countries it partners with maintain an incentive to be forthcoming and cooperative in the WTO negotiations and that its RTAs are not overly trade diverting. In fact, there are a series of measures the United States could take unilaterally or in cooperation with their RTA partners using its negotiating leverage to minimize the harmful effects of regionalism on the WTO system, some of which the United States is already undertaking but that could be further emphasized. These measures include the following:
* Explore the possibility of including obligations, not just preambular language, in RTAs requiring WTO partner countries to cooperate positively within WTO negotiations, not just on specific issues but also more generally. n44 While it might be hard to enforce such an obligation, it would certainly provide further negotiating leverage within the WTO when the United States asks for cooperation on progress in the WTO from an RTA partner country.
* Emphasize in broader diplomatic discussions with potential RTA partner countries, the need for those countries to participate actively and positively in WTO negotiations, n45 and continue to make WTO membership and cooperation a condition of launching RTA negotiations with a given country. * Explore the possibility of linking, either explicitly or de facto, RTA tariff cut accelerations (that reduce the amount of time it takes under an RTA to fully eliminate tariffs on a given product) to progress/concrete results in the WTO multilateral negotiations. In other words, say to RTA partners 'you keep your preference margins for the same amount of time even if you are forthcoming and cooperative in multilateral negotiations because we will reduce the preferential rate under the RTA faster as you cooperate to reduce MFN rates faster within the WTO'. n46
* Continuing to explore and negotiate sectoral customs unions (i.e. harmonize the tariffs charged to third countries) with RTA partners. Sectoral customs unions reduce the problems and costs associated with applying rules of origin. The United States already has a sectoral custom union with Canada on computers and, given the similarity in MFN rates between the two countries, other sectoral customs unions are possible. n47
* Continuing to liberalize rules of origin within existing RTAs where possible (e.g. as was done in 2002 and again in 2006 within NAFTA).
* Maintain and improve the high standards of trade coverage in the RTAs it concludes so as to minimize any defensive interests it has with respect to RTAs as regards WTO-compliance but continue to resist exempting RTA partner countries from US anti-dumping law.
It is important to realize that some of these measures are potentially politically difficult, such as tariff accelerations and rule of origin liberalization, depending on what products are involved. Additionally, unlike WTO efforts, these US unilateral efforts cannot 'clean-up' or make more robust those RTAs to which it is not a party. Thus, these US efforts must be viewed as a supplement, rather than a replacement, for efforts within the WTO to improve disciplines on RTAs. However, these US efforts could potentially have a more immediate impact than efforts within the WTO.
IV. Conclusion
RTA activity by the United States and even other countries traditionally opposed to regionalism has rapidly expanded in the past decade. This trend is unlikely to be halted as political and diplomatic considerations will require future FTAs even if the WTO negotiations process for further multilateral liberalization is reinvigorated. Proponents of the WTO system have concerns that this RTA activity, as currently structured, may not be fulfilling the original economic conditions creating the basis for the exception in the WTO system for RTAs. Specifically, there is much concern over the exclusion of agriculture from many RTAs, the use of highly complex and restrictive rules of origin within RTAs, and the varied treatment of trade remedies within RTAs. While the WTO has two mechanisms to cure these controversies, specifically its negotiating rounds and dispute settlement system, doubts exist as to how much progress can be made utilizing these two mechanisms. As a result, and somewhat ironically, US unilateral efforts and use of US negotiating leverage with its RTA partners may be, at the very least, a necessary supplement to efforts in the WTO to ensure that RTAs are complementing the WTO system.
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国际经济法杂志 1九月2007
与国际经济法（2007）10（3）：585 长度：8672字
主题：世贸组织的区域贸易协定的约束
标题：确保区域贸易协定补充世贸组织体系：美国单边主义补充世贸组织倡议？ 作者：舍费尔，法学教授，内布拉斯加大学法学院。电子邮件：mschaefer1@unlnotes.unl.edu 文本：
摘要20世纪90年代中期，政策辩论集中在是否在世贸组织的区域贸易协定（区域贸易协定）构件或障碍的体制，本质上是适当的所有质疑区域主义从经济政策的角度。鉴于区域贸易协定以来，时间和无法回滚时钟，政策辩论已取代了一个寻求加强限制等活动，可以确保它补充世贸组织体系。三个主要的争议在许多现有的区域贸易安排，排除农业覆盖，复杂和限制性原产地规则，和不同的治疗中应用的贸易救济措施。尽管一些竞争政策的考虑，它可能是，在平衡，该系统将有利于农业必须包括在区域贸易协定的范围，如果区域贸易协定原产地规则进行简化和自由，如果争议处理贸易救济等过了。然而，搜索限制在世贸组织系统实现这些结果，或者通过多哈谈判和争端解决机制似乎不可能成功，在不久的将来。因此，加强和扩大努力的我们，要么单边或连同其合作伙伴和利用其谈判筹码，可能是一个必要的补充努力在世贸组织保障之间的关系更为融洽区域贸易协定和世贸组织体系。 景区简介
几乎每一个重要的成员加入了一个区域贸易协定（中毒），大约有一半的世界贸易发生优惠关税税率。到2006年底，超过368个区域贸易协定的世贸组织通知，其中260发生在一月1995，反映了在中毒活动，实际上开始于80年代末90年代初。预计到2010，超过400个区域贸易协定将在世界各地实施。氮气的辩论，在学术界和政策界在上世纪90年代主要集中在是否同时构件图或绊脚石的多边体系4。具体的批评是针对美国，为追求区域因其过分议价能力在双边和小组协商。然而，我们从区域贸易协定谈判禁欲从1995 - 2000年没有干的浪潮地区主义。此外，美国历来只变成了一个强有力的区域议程时，世贸组织已经停滞进一步实现贸易自由化。
鉴于区域贸易协定，无法倒流的政治和外交的美国资本投资振兴其贸易议程，政策辩论已转移到一个接受存在的区域贸易安排和重点的机制，在世贸组织系统与外部系统可以确保这一强有力的贸易活动补充，而不是减损，世贸组织体系。第
一部分本文探讨的三个主要争议与区域贸易协定：排除农业重大的自由化在许多区域贸易协定，复杂和限制性原产地规则的区域贸易协定，以及不同治疗贸易救济法律在区域贸易协定。第二部分审查现有的限制使用的区域贸易协定和探讨的可能性，加强世贸组织的限制，特别是消除一些消极后果从这些争议。第三部分认为美国可以进行哪些努力要么单边或与区域贸易协定的合作伙伴帮助确保区域与全球贸易系统。分析在第二和第三部分揭示了潜在的巨大讽刺：单方面行动和美国的行动在联同其伙伴使用的谈判筹码等重要的美国在双边和区域谈判可能更成功的努力下，或至少有一个必要的补充努力下，确保区域贸易协定的世贸组织体系更好的补充。
我主要争议区域贸易协定
原来的关贸总协定（1947-94）和随后的系统（1995至今）都允许例外的区域贸易协定中，部分是因为人们认为，贸易创造效应的区域贸易协定，遵守一定的条件，奠定了在关贸总协定/世贸组织系统会超过任何贸易牵制效应（即贸易增长之间的区域贸易协定国家将大于损失的第三个国家之间的贸易和区域贸易协定的国家）。5然而，含糊不清，在规定的条件，在关贸总协定/世贸组织协定系统已导致至少三个主要争议的方式，区域贸易协定已：（一）农业排除在许多区域贸易协定的范围，至少在一定范围；（二）许多区域贸易协定有高度复杂的和限制性的原产地规则转移贸易可能来自第三个国家的贸易伙伴国家投入使用作为伙伴国家而不是廉价的投入第三个国家遵守原产地规则必要获得优惠关税率达和（三）许多区域贸易协定不排除应用产品等贸易救济措施从伙伴国，因此不会导致全面放开外贸内，但可提供一些特殊的治疗，在这方面，有可能创造第三个国家的影响。除了法律含糊不清，使这些争议，每一个主要的问题有很多经济的细微差别和众多的竞争政策的考虑，不仅要在贸易创造的贸易转移问题考虑也影响这些中毒特点对国家奖励，即将在世贸组织的谈判。 A .排除农业
世贸组织研究早在多哈回合谈判中证实，两方面的百分比贸易免税税目，农业自由化不是几乎一样：工业产品在区域贸易协定。美国许多区域贸易协定利用负面列表的方法（包括除非明确排除）工业产品，相比之下，采用积极清单办法（不包括具体包括农产品除外）。此外，当一个农业产品是包含在一个区域贸易协定，它往往是受关税的减少而不是义务消除。-最后，有不协调的重叠区域贸易安排在农业互联网和关税高峰更有可能仍然在农业部门。
对这一现象的原因是行为的国家在区域贸易协定对农业问题往往在很大程度上平行其行为对农业问题在世贸组织。如果在这一思路，排除农业仅仅是另一个症状或表现同样的政治敏感性，防止重大自由化的世贸组织。然而，它可能允许快速活动，基本上排除农业确实损害多边自由化的努力在世界贸易组织。区域贸易协定，允许排除农产品获得国家增加市场准入的工业产品和从事新规则的发展没有参与政治艰难的农业自由化的话，他们无法摆脱在世贸组织的“一揽子协议的谈判框架。承担国家奉行的区域贸易协定没有农业自由化将选择不追求他们，如果他们需要包括农业商品在一个更令人生厌的方式，则会成为世贸组织的专属论
坛，他们追求工业品自由化和新规则的创作，他们只会获得这种自由化和新规则交换农业自由化。越另外，国家可能会追求区域贸易协定，包括农业更充分，从而开始琢磨这个巨大的保护主义情绪在这一领域，虽然有一些潜在的重大贸易转移关税率高充电到第三国家影响要求从那些国家相比，区域贸易协定的伙伴国产品受到优惠利率。另一个可能的情况是，国家防御利益在农业部门可能只是追求区域贸易协定和国家不威胁其农业部门，但这至少会减少数量和活动，还增加的压力，政府利用论坛。无论这些情形，要求包括农业在区域贸易协定将是一个净效益的系统。
B .复杂和限制性的区域贸易协定原产地规则
区域贸易安排，包括原产地规则确保产品更紧密连接三分之一个国家没有收到的优惠待遇等第三国的不支付关税优惠。区域贸易协定原产地规则往往是更严格的（严格的）比非优惠原产地规则的国家，特别是对敏感的项目。关注已表示，过分限制性的区域贸易协定原产地规则扩大贸易和投资的牵制作用的区域贸易协定。更复杂的和限制性的区域贸易协定原产地规则，更可以导致公司区域内使用的伙伴国的投入而不是便宜第三国家投入为确保遵守原产地规则必须获得优惠关税待遇给予中毒。
剪切复杂的规则，尤其是当一个人认为，许多国家缔约方许多重叠的区域贸易协定，造成了大量的行政和执行费用的交易商和海关人员（通常被称为“意大利面碗效应性）。事实上，在产品的关税率低（因此有一个低保证金）一些交易者只选择支付最惠国率比受行政费用按区域贸易协定原产地规则（如大量的美墨贸易发生在最惠国率）。
然而，具有讽刺意味的是进一步等活动会减少这种义大利面碗效应作为合并的发生之间的重叠区域贸易协定。广阔的区域性贸易协定，如欧盟的扩大，从15到25个国家后，欧盟的扩大，包括大多数中欧和东欧国家在2004，和now-stalled美洲自由贸易协定（美洲自由贸易区）34个国家可以减少之间的谈判，虽然没有消除，显然，复杂性。另一个竞争的考虑是，严格的原产地规则最大限度的奖励第三个国家参加多边自由化，因为他们很少有机会“搭便车”优惠区域贸易协定。尽管这些竞合的考虑，平衡，人们普遍认为从政策角度看，不那么严格和不太复杂的区域贸易协定原产地规则将更好地实现关贸总协定第24条的目标是建立贸易伙伴之间的贸易不挪用它从第三个国家。
C治疗贸易救济（保障措施，反倾销）
区域贸易协定的变化很大，他们如何处理应用贸易救济法律之间的成员-从虚拟排斥这种补救措施（虽然通常的情况下保障措施与建立一个较小的rta-specific紧急救济）继续应用全球保障措施和反倾销法律。然而，排除贸易救济法是比较罕见的持续应用这些规律。
许多国家正在犹豫不决的问题，在区域贸易协定的贸易救济措施。最深的欲望被排除在适用这样的法律，特别是大市场的国家如美国，在区域贸易协定同这些国家将导致更大的贸易自由化。然而，当他们在区域贸易协定提供的排斥，部分或全部，从贸易救济法，他们相信他们的利益受到这种排斥，即他们采取一个更大的打击，当补救措施的应用。世贸组织上诉机构并没有排除在贸易伙伴是否排除从应用贸易救济是必要的，允许或禁止的除外，关贸总协定的区域性贸易协定，但他们已减轻，后者关注的执政党必须有之间的平行进口的调查和补救（即国家不包括进口贸易伙伴在调查，从而使其更可能会被视为造成国内产业损害的，然后他们排除在救济阶段）。页
治疗贸易救济法律在美国和其他大型市场区域贸易协定可以有重大影响的国家愿意采取多边自由化。美国仍然是最大的用户（尽管欧盟反倾销法也是一个庞大的用户和许多发展中国家的显着增加其使用的法律）。如果美国开始提供排除反倾销法律的同时，这些区域贸易协定的伙伴国家会降低激励参与多边自由化进程。同样，保障措施，大大增加了创造以来，世贸组织在1995（和禁止所谓的灰色等措施的自愿限制协议）。因此，被排除在全球应用保障措施也是可取的区域贸易协定的谈判伙伴国家美国。回顾美国市场，从最惠国关税税率，是相对开放的。因此，最大的投诉的外国贸易伙伴美国往往侧重于广泛使用所谓的“保护主义”或贸易救济法律队伍。
当然，可以做出类似的论点就排除贸易救济那些方面纳入农业。如果国家被要求豁免贸易伙伴贸易救济，那么至少有一些国家，如美国，可能在很大程度上停止贸易活动由于政治敏感性改变或削弱贸易救济法律。另外，可以订立协定豁免伙伴国家从贸易救济，从而慢慢地削弱贸易保护主义的敏感性，虽然可能增加第三个国家的影响。平衡，然而，它可能是多边自由化的努力将受益于我们至少保留的反倾销谈判多哈回合这芯片芯片是少数重要的美国保持力进一步最惠国关税自由化在其他国家（美国最惠国率，如前所述，一般已相当低）。因为我们最新应用保障的补救措施是不一样大的谈判筹码为反倾销法律，它可能是不太有害于世贸组织贸易自由化过程中如果我们取代全球保障补救措施与rta-specific紧急补救措施相对于其贸易伙伴国。
②。加强对区域贸易协定的世贸组织的限制
三个主要的争论，同时存在由于缺乏明确的周围现有的限制范围内的世。体制机制在世贸组织体系确实存在，澄清和加强这些现有的限制，然而，许多并发症，可能继续以前无法防止机制被成功地利用。 答：现有的约束n15
关贸总协定第24条允许成立关税同盟，自由贸易协定和临时协议导致形成这样的协议，在一个合理的时间长度的。然而，语言中的第24条是广泛的，不精确的语言，结合充分审查和监测，留下了大量空间在实践的成员自动判读的区域贸易协定。（对应的语言在总协定服务贸易（服务贸易总协定）第五世和语言在授权条款允许区域贸易协定的发展中国家之间充满如果没有更多的不确定性和回旋的余地）。第二十四宣称的目的应该是促进贸易和其成员之间的不提高贸易壁
垒的国家第三。在内部要求的区域贸易协定，第24条规定的关税和其他限制性商业法规（除，必要时，允许的艺术。十一，十二，十四，十五，和二十）n16消除实质上所有贸易方面。在外部条件的要求，区域贸易协定不征收关税和其他贸易法规的高于或更严格的比一般发病率关税与贸易法规中存在的区域贸易协定的成员国领土之前形成的区域贸易协定。最新一轮的乌拉圭对第24条澄清某些相关问题的赔偿谈判和评估关税壁垒影响第三方交易后形成或扩大关税同盟〔J〕也阐明了合理期限的临时安排一般是指十年。然而，认识不澄清一些相关的具体问题所产生的增加和上面描述的活动。
首先，“实质上所有贸易的不明确，使开放的问题，是否这样的决定应根据行业或税号或一些组合。例如，可以提出问题是否中毒，不符合要求的实质上所有农业农业是一个很小的百分比之间的贸易，区域贸易协定成员（也许是因为高贸易壁垒），考虑到农产品构成大约15%的关税线。序言部分对乌拉圭回合谅解，世贸组织成员承认的贡献，同时，对世界贸易的扩大是减弱，如果任何重大部门排除在'。虽然这种语言可以影响一词的解释，“几乎所有的，它不是一种责任和本身。
其次，理解并没有澄清是否例外列表的实质上所有要求独家列表或不。因此，可以提出问题，内部的区域贸易协定，需要（或至少允许）消除贸易救济法的应用（如关贸总协定第十九条保障授权和授权的反倾销关税关贸总协定第六）成员之间。
第三，该条款的其他贸易法规和其他限制性商业法规的不明确，使开放的问题是否和原产地规则列入这些术语的意义。例如，可以提出问题是否原产地规则应包括在评估是否障碍第三个国家贸易更高或更严格的比pre-rta障碍n19甚至考虑到在确定是否实质上所有的贸易已经自由化，区域贸易协定成员间。20 现有的审查和监测程序型
关贸总协定第24条要求各国“及时通知其他世贸组织成员在决定进入一个区域贸易协定并提供这种信息将使世贸组织成员提出报告和建议。在实践中，许多通知之后发生的区域贸易协定的最后定稿。关贸总协定之下，个人的工作是建立审查区域贸易安排，通知身体。在几乎每一个回顾，工作组无法达成任何共识，一致性的区域贸易协定与第24条要求。1996年二月，总理事会建立委员会的区域贸易协定中，努力提高审查和监测的区域贸易协定。然而，重大问题仍然存在。委员会已达成共识，一致性在一个案件中，即使世贸组织区域贸易协定最真实的考试准备委员会已举行了收养。此外，该协会主席抱怨2002不愿国家提供，或重大拖延提供，信息的区域贸易协定的事实检查报告。一些本不愿意据称是由于所谓的“争端解决意识”（即担心他们的信息会导致和/或用来对付他们在未来的争端解决案例）。 C .论坛加强约束
2可能的途径，加强世贸组织目前存在的制约区域贸易协定：广阔的多哈回合谈判（推出2001）和世贸组织争端解决机制。在线
1。谈判
多哈部长宣言发起当前一轮谈判提供了以下任务：谈判贸易协定的澄清和改善纪律和程序在现有的世贸组织区域贸易协定的规定申请。区域贸易协定的文学是充满了许多影响深远的改进建议世贸组织纪律。大多数这些在政治上是不可行的，虽然有一些意义深远的建议在文献中已经可以看到反映在政府的建议。 例如，在努力结束歧视第三个国家建立的区域贸易协定，有人建议，世贸组织的要求应该是一个开放的加入的条款包括在所有区域贸易协定。最新的提案忽略关键的问题有什么优惠将被要求的国家希望加入，铭记淘汰时期对某些商品的关税是重要的，即使所有的贸易是在区域贸易协定自由化。这样的要求也忽略了非贸易目标，是重要的考虑因素在选择贸易伙伴（如古巴是没有参与美洲自由贸易区谈判）。化工，台湾建议，世贸组织需要这样一个条款将在所有区域贸易协定的协议，说明回应批评，它只是需要一个机会来洽谈。最新也有人建议，世贸组织应举行谈判优惠原产地规则的协调。n27然而，极为协调谈判进展缓慢，非优惠性原产地规则（最初由于归纳为1997但是今天还在继续）告诫进行谈判的棘手的话题的优惠原产地规则。
另一个建议中的文学是一个建议，区域贸易协定关税削减延长最惠国基础上五年的削减从而限制长度的时间偏好下的区域贸易协定可以留在地方的五年。n28这个建议，如果采用批发，可能会导致“脏”区域贸易协定更多次分拆和/或大大减少激励的第三个国家参加多边自由化（简单地搭便车和关税削减他们
multilateralized）。然而，美国提议在多哈回合2003消除一切关税全球2015年已取得优势的学术方案（限制的时间长度和偏好将留在地方）但没有缺点，因为它不允许任何自由骑士。当然，其他大多数国家认为美国太深远的和政治上可行的建议以及因为发展中国家会失去他们的偏好在普惠制和其他方案在工业化国家的市场，会有不利后果的发展中国家严重依赖于税作为政府收入的来源（在没有改进税收结构执行）。迄今为止，只有非常有限的透明度的建议已成功在多哈谈判，即使是少量的实质性或全身性建议继续产生重大分歧，世贸组织成员。 A .透明度协议。多哈谈判导致之间的协议，政府增加透明度的区域贸易协定。n29于2006年七月，世贸组织成员同意暂时实施之前的结论，这轮谈判，协议要求世贸组织成员：（一）通知其他成员的启动谈判的区域贸易协定；（二）通知其他成员签署的协议和（三）正式通知后立即中毒批准。因此，其他成员意识到，可以跟踪区域贸易协定的发展从开始到结束。透明度协议还需要通知世贸组织的变化，实现或操作的中毒发生后，原来的通知。信息流是提高透明度的协议，它奠定了信息，必须提供通知的数据包括tariff-line让步协议，交易量数据，原产地规则的提法，等等此外，争端解决的认识问题是部分解决，因为事实报告正在编写的秘书处的咨询有关各方。n30
虽然这种透明度协议可能是一个有用的一步，它不能解决任何实质性分歧的关键术语第24条。此外，必须牢记，实施的透明度协议仍然依赖于诚信会员（以及加强同侪压力）遵守和，一般来说，不会有任何重大处罚不遵守通知/透明度义务（如许多国家都发现了通知义务世贸组织其他协定）。
B .实质性/系统性的建议。政府建议的实质性或系统性问题一般都集中在澄清“实质上所有的贸易（及相关问题的其他贸易法规和其他限制性商业法规”）。至于问题的实质上所有的贸易，成员仍在讨论是否要使用一个贸易量的测试或
tariff-line试验或两者的某种组合。这个问题的一个纯tariff-line测试是当事人对达能自由化比例很高的关税自由化但仍然不高比例的贸易关税线如果他们拒绝放宽目前占很大比例的国家之间的贸易在中毒。这个问题的一个纯贸易型试验是贸易量波动（因此协议的一致性测试可能在贸易波动以及）。n31贸易型的测试也可能让国家的区域贸易协定排除许多关税线从自由化，目前没有太多的贸易而可能在未来被关税降低。n32因此，许多国家都倾向于某种形式的联合试验，特别是那些有兴趣在治疗agriculture-exclusion问题筛选目前许多区域贸易协定。例如，澳大利亚，一个重要的农业国，提出了一种类型的组合试验。澳大利亚提交的建议，至少有70%个税号放开后立即生效，95%个区域贸易协定关税线全面放开十年内缔结区域贸易协定。为了解决问题，一些关税与贸易量高被排除，澳大利亚将补充其税号的办法，要求前50个税号而言，贸易额列入义务消除下区域贸易协定或任何关税线，构成0.2%的总进口列入自由化。
其它国家都不满意，纯粹的定量测试，要至少补充任何定量与定性因素。例如，日本提出以下定性因素考虑：（一）排除任何主要部门（虽然结合定量测试澳大利亚将做好确保这不会发生在一个区域贸易协定）；（二）的影响，贸易救济措施；（三）的程度，降低关税；（四）评估关税率配额和（五）取消关税的实施周期长。这些定性因素明显的配合等问题什么构成的其他商业规定”和“合理的时间内”实施一项临时协议导致中毒。欧洲联盟还主张定性以及定量评估区域贸易协定增加了一些其他因素，可能被认为特别保障措施，包括在区域贸易协定和季节性产品的限制。n35然而，定性因素可能导致相同的模棱两可的一致性的区域贸易协定与世贸组织学科为今天发生的，有些国家可能表明这些因素保持泥泞的水域保护和强大的区域贸易协定的挑战。
就澄清“其他商业规定”，印度已提出明确同意，区域贸易协定原产地规则范围内的其他贸易法规的。印度的建议也提出了要求，区域贸易协定原产地规则是没有更多的限制比最自由的普惠制方案所经营的任何成员国的区域贸易协定。很少，如果任何，区域贸易协定，将目前符合条件，我们可以想象的距离，仍然需要弥补在这个问题上的谈判。
也许并不奇怪，因为不同的区域贸易协定，不妥协和共识上已取得实质性的和系统性的问题，控制协定。没有共识，草案文本已准备；事实上，政府甚至不愿意提交文本的建议。
C .“祖父”问题。一些国家，包括欧洲联盟，建议在现有的区域贸易协定谈判的早期，应该是“享受”，即免除任何新的限制，在谈判过程中。n36这应该是强烈反对的原因有几个。首先，它可能影响的二大道加强限制的制度，即，它可能，这取决于如何措辞，直接或间接地影响能力的世贸组织成员成功地挑战现有的区域贸易协定的世贸组织争端解决机制。其次，在新的实质性限制不仅影响或阻止未来的区域贸易协定，这些限制会锁定在地方一个糟糕的事务的状态会存在进一步的区域活动，如上面提到的，一些更广泛的区域倡议目前正在进行可帮助减少现
有的义大利面碗效应。第三，为中国指出在提交，祖父现有的区域贸易协定将歧视国家最近才进入等活动。n37 2。世贸争端解决体系
乌拉圭回合对第24条消除不确定性，存在于关贸总协定体系是否挑战协定的争端解决机制是可能的，号明确宣称争端解决体系是开放的挑战。事实上，上诉机构指出（或至少是非常强烈暗示）在2000土耳其纺织品，他们将审查合格的区域贸易协定与内部和外部的要求第二十四条提出这样的要求。n39此外，关贸总协定/世贸组织法律不承认的概念龙头（即长期拖延的一个挑战是rita不会导致一个推定符合的中毒与第24条）。利因此，对一个案件的区域贸易协定是一个合法的可能性。然而，这种情况成为现实，取决于几个因素。而至少有一些律师在直流贸易酒吧相信政府能够成功地追求和挑战，把这种情况进行一些风险。首先，因为几乎所有世贸组织成员方区域贸易协定和标准的审查整合是如此广泛和准确，大部分成员将看到至少有一些防御利益的问题。其次，潜在的原告将需要考虑之间的相互作用和正在进行的谈判争端解决案例。如果谈判协定在多哈回合导致无收获，然后一个争端解决案件可能是唯一的希望，走向有形的限制。这是一个战略不是没有风险的，然而，因为如果一个失败时，将有更少的谈判动机。第三，有一些制度性风险的上诉机构被视为“法律”给予广泛的不精确的语言，这种说法将是基于（类似争议上诉机构的裁决，在该地区的法庭之友简报）。次级事实上，而上诉机构不愿意走回头路，这是可能的，他们会使用工具的司法克制，避免直接解决这样的抱怨。n42
除了这些一般性考虑，最有可能的原告国家似乎已经有点混乱的利益追求这种情况。这个国家历史上最反对增加等活动（日本，韩国，新加坡和香港），和最有可能成为原告为全身性的原因，现在谈判和缔结协定（信号如果你不能打败他们，加入他们的心理）。一个潜在的说法，可能是在挑战的区域贸易协定是其失败的自由化的主要产业如农业经营发生冲突的“几乎所有的标准，内部市场化。然而，日本和韩国是防御性的农业问题不可能使这一特殊的挑战。事实上，日本是有问题的区域贸易协定的谈判取得了突飞猛进的发展由于其农业敏感性。韩国的纸张上的区域贸易安排在多哈表明它有许多问题与区域贸易协定但尚不清楚他们会选择去解决争议的途径（至少直到谈判的进展可以更清楚地评估）。
美国是另一个潜在的原告。证明了80年代的挑战，欧洲地中海协定（欧共体的协议与地中海国家），美国的申诉对区域贸易协定已在过去，仍然是一个未来的可能性。欧盟的区域贸易协定是可能的目标，这样的情况n43美国肯定不想挑战一个拉丁美洲和恐惧的可能性进一步损害恢复美洲自由贸易区谈判在未来的某一时刻。然而，欧美关系的总体状况和疲劳与其他有争议的案件表明，另一个爆炸案，如中毒的投诉，可能是不可能的在不久的未来。
澳大利亚（或另一个凯恩斯集团成员）是另一个可能的原告。传统上，人们认为第三个国家农业出口商没有兴趣的挑战agricultural-exclusions在区域贸易协定（本质上要求受到负面的优惠幅度）但影响大量agricultural-excluded区域贸易协定对多边自由化（和/或查看任何rta-induced农业改革最终可能受益或扩大到第三个国家）会改变这种传统的计算，虽然迄今还没有。
三、美国可以进行单方面或区域贸易协定补充确保多边主义
相当广泛的分歧在世贸组织的谈判就如何确保区域贸易协定的世贸组织体系的补充，并没有原告不愿向前一步，在世贸组织争端解决制度的合法性挑战广泛的区域贸易协定，问题是关于什么行动美国，作为世界最大的经济体和多谈判的筹码，可以保证至少有其自身的成长地区主义补充世贸组织体系。具体来说，问题是，美国是否已在其处置奉行其区域议程，确保其他国家的合作伙伴保持激励即将合作在世贸组织的谈判，同时不会过分的贸易转移。事实上，有一系列的措施，美国可以采取单方面或合作伙伴的区域使用其谈判筹码，以尽量减少有害影响区域主义在世贸组织体系，其中美国已经承诺但可以进一步强调。这些措施包括如下：
探索的可能性，包括序言，不只是语言，在区域贸易协定要求世贸组织伙伴国家积极合作在世贸组织的谈判，不只是在具体问题上也更为普遍。最新虽然可能难以执行这样一种义务，它肯定会提供进一步的谈判筹码，在世界贸易组织时，美国要求合作的进展从一世贸易伙伴国。
*强调在更广泛的外交讨论与潜在的贸易伙伴国家的需要，对这些国家的积极参与和积极的谈判中，最新和继续使世贸组织成员和合作条件开展谈判一国贸易。 探索的可能性连接，要么明确或事实上，区域贸易协定的关税削减加速度（即减少所需的时间，在一个区域完全消除关税，一个给定的产品）的进展/具体成果在世贸组织多边谈判。换句话说，说等合作伙伴保持优惠幅度相同数量的时间就算你即将和合作多边谈判，因为我们将减少优惠率下的和更快的为您合作减少最惠国更快地在世贸组织的。名字
*不断探索和谈判部门关税同盟（即协调关税收取第三个国家与区域贸易协定的合作伙伴）。海关工会部门减少的问题和相关费用申请原产地规则。美国已经有一个部门的关税同盟与加拿大的电脑，由于相似的最惠国两国间，其他部门的关税同盟是可能的。最新
*继续放宽原产地规则在现有的区域贸易协定在可能的（例如，是在2002和2006在北美自由贸易协定）。
*保持和改善高标准的贸易在区域贸易协定最后以减少任何防御利益已就区域贸易协定方面wto-compliance但继续抵制贸易伙伴国家豁免从美国反倾销法。 重要的是要认识到，其中一些措施可能是政治上的困难，如关税加速度和原产地规则自由化，这取决于产品的参与。此外，与世贸组织的努力，这些单方面的努力不能'清理'或作出更强有力的那些区域贸易协定，它不是一个党。因此，这些工作必须被视为补充，而不是替代，努力提高学科在世贸组织的区域贸易协定。然而，这些努力可能会有一个更直接的影响比在世贸组织的努力。 四。结论
区域贸易协定的活动由美国甚至其他国家传统上反对地区主义迅速扩大在过去的十年。这种趋势是不可能停止为政治和外交上的考虑将要求未来的自由贸易协定，即使世贸组织谈判过程作进一步的多边自由化是振兴。支持者的世贸组织体系担心这等活动，目前的结构，可能无法履行原有的经济条件的基础上创造的例外在世贸组织系统协定。具体来说，有很大的关注，排除农业从许多区域贸易协定，使用高度复杂和限制性原产地规则协定内，和不同的治疗在区域贸易协定的贸易救济措施。虽然世贸组织有机制来解决这些争议，特别是其谈判和争端解决机制，怀疑存在如何取得了多大进展利用这些机制。因此，有些具有讽刺意味的是，美国单方面的努力和美国使用的谈判筹码，其贸易伙伴可能是，最起码的必要补充，努力确保在世贸组织协定补充世贸组织体系。
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